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Introduction
With a few individual exceptions, the Pentagon's preparations for this cataclysmic storm in the days before landfall were slow and unsure. Situational awareness was poor, and the Pentagon was hesitant to move necessary assets unless they were requested. Our military is superb at planning for different threat situations, but it appears that they did not do much planning in advance of Katrina to anticipate the challenges of an incident of national significance.
-Joseph Lieberman
Hurricane Katrina was the largest physical disaster this nation has suffered in modern history. The hurricane formed in late August during the 2005 hurricane season and caused devastation along much of the north-central Gulf Coast of the United States. The storm wreaked physical damage along its path, flooded the city of New Orleans, killed over 1,300 people, and became the most destructive natural disaster in American history.
2 Federal disaster declarations blanketed over 93,000 square miles of the United States, an area almost as large as Great Britain and left an estimated five million people without power. 3 Furthermore, the combination of high winds, heavy rainfall, and storm surge led to the failure of the earthen levees that separate New
Orleans from surrounding lakes resulting in parts of the city under 20 feet of water.
Natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina are uncommon. The devastation created by the storm was immense and spread across multiple states on the Gulf Coast. For most natural disasters, leadership of the affected region is managed and directed at the lowest level. local responders are normally the first ones on the scene directing relief efforts. When local capabilities are exhausted, state emergency management officials, at the direction of the Governor, are normally available to provide prompt augmentation capability. Only after these local and state capabilities are exhausted will requests for federal assistance be submitted through a formal request process.
Hurricane Katrina was different from many other hurricanes and natural disasters in that it was almost immediately a regional catastrophic disaster. According to the National Response Plan, a catastrophic incident is, "any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.
It almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal, and privatesector authorities in the impacted area; significantly disrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened."
4 In Katrina's case, local and state authorities were indeed immediately overwhelmed. Without the ability to successfully communicate or conduct damage assessments, state and local leaders lost the ability to prioritize tasks and render proper assistance to stranded survivors in a timely fashion.
Additionally, requests for much-needed federal assistance were delayed due to confusion and poor coordination between leaders at all levels of the response.
The subject of most public consternation following the storm was that of the perceived slow federal response and accompanying speed of rescue and relief operations. Shortly after the levees were breached, the federal government received scathing criticism of its response from many public figures regarding its immediate response efforts. The mayor of New Orleans, Ray
Nagin, said in a radio conference with a local news station, "You mean to tell me that in a place where you probably have thousands of people that have died and thousands more that are dying every day, that we can't figure out a way to authorize the resources that we need? Come on man.
Get off your asses and let's do something… I don't know whose problem it is. I don't know whether it's the governor's problem. I don't know whether it's the president's problem, but somebody needs to get their ass on a plane and sit down, and figure this out right now. Although an invaluable role in its response, limitations were found and lessons were learned.
Besides the multitude of federal and state issues regarding cooperation and coordination between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DHS, state, and local authorities, multiple lessons were also learned within our military. In particular, Mr. Paul
McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, noted in his testimony to the Congressional Committee on Armed Services the need to: improve the ability to obtain timely and accurate assessment of damaged areas immediately after an event, examine ways to achieve effective coordination and unity of effort when multiple federal agencies converge on an affected area, enhance the ability to communicate with first responders on the ground, integrate fully both Active Duty and Reserve Components into pre-event and on-scene operational planning for catastrophic events, and re-examine the role of the DoD in responding to a catastrophic event.
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Although the Air Force and Air National Guard provided an invaluable, life-saving service, there is still room for improvement. The remainder of this thesis will explore military involvement in domestic disaster response with particular emphasis placed on Hurricane Katrina relief operations. This analysis will explore how and when our military forces get involved in disaster response, lessons-learned from Hurricane Katrina, steps necessary for a quicker response, and methods to provide information to first responders quicker. In particular, the latter part of the thesis will focus on airborne intelligence assets, their contributions to disaster response, and a comprehensive look at what the Air Force needs to do to improve response to disaster relief operations in the future. The theory is simple; through better training, improved communications, and a detailed National Response Plan and organizational structure, our airborne ISR assets can provide real-time imagery and full-motion video to on-scene providers, command and control authorities, and relief operators at all levels throughout the chain of command.
The Military Role in Disaster Response
How the "Normal" Disaster System Works
The United States has a tiered disaster response system. As mentioned previously, after During Hurricane Katrina, over 50,000 National Guardsmen responded to the crisis under Title 32 activation. JTF-Katrina also activated and had operational control of an additional 20,000 Title 10 federal troops. The dual chain of command between federal and state activated troops resulted in a failure of unity of effort between the different forces. In fact, there were numerous instances of National Guard and federal troops assigned to the same operating area without knowledge of each others' assignments. Overall lack of a common unity of effort resulted in the inability to gain situational awareness and organize and execute the disaster response. Problems caused by the lack of unity of effort included a lack of timely damage assessments, communications problems, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, unexpected logistics responsibilities, and force integration issues. Many of the men and women of the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United States military, the National Guard, Homeland Security, and state and local governments performed skillfully under the worst conditions. Yet the system, at every level of government, was not well coordinated and was overwhelmed in the first few days.
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The lack of coordination at the federal headquarters level reflected confusing organizational structures in the field and was at the heart of the problems post Katrina.
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The basis for disaster response is spelled out in the National Response Plan. However, as written, the NRP does not provide adequate guidance for regional incidents involving more than one state. Additionally, it lacks specific guidance as to how the DoD should be used and what resources it should provide in the event of a domestic natural disaster. Future response efforts will be dependent on not only the ability to communicate, but also interoperability between counterparts at all component levels of the response. Communications must be reliable, flexible, survivable, and mobile. In this vein, the rewritten NRP suggested earlier in this thesis must demand a national, federally-mandated, common standard for communications used in disaster response. Moreover, because the DoD has a vast array of communications systems, a great deal of experience using them worldwide, and existing avenues for procuring, testing, and fielding communications systems, the military should be tasked to develop this interoperable emergency communications standard. Focus should be on readily available, commercial off the shelf systems that can function in an austere environment. As noted throughout this report, disaster response starts and ultimately ends at the local level.
Agencies at the local and state levels must abide by these new standards written in the NRP and plan, program, and budget appropriately so that interoperable communications resources will be available for future incidents of national significance at all levels.
ISR Tools for the First Responders
Preliminary Damage Assessments During the early stages of an incident of national significance, local and federal officials expend vast amounts of resources conducting damage assessments of the affected areas. These preliminary damage assessment (PDA) teams are commonly transported by wheeled vehicle into the affected area to survey the extent of the damage. Team members collect specific data that their particular agency then uses to help allocate resources to the relief effort. 43 The NRP indicates that, "based on these teams' findings, State Governors may request a Presidential declaration of emergency and define the kind of Federal assistance needed." 44 One of the lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew in 1992, was that "a community hit by a major disaster that overwhelms its capabilities will need assistance as soon as possible to begin the damage assessment process which will then lay the foundation for appropriate response and recovery efforts". 45 Unfortunately, this lesson learned was "lost" on Katrina and many of the damage assessments necessary for recovery efforts did not occur until days after the storm hit.
Preliminary damage assessments are nothing new to the military. In fact, what the NRP calls PDA is essentially the same as military reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is the active gathering of information to provide information to leadership in order to enhance the decision making process. Unfortunately, during Hurricane Katrina, the DoD's planning did not initially call for the use of the military's reconnaissance assets to conduct preliminary damage assessment. The GAO, in its report on Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, found that, "Because state and local officials were overwhelmed and the military's extensive reconnaissance capabilities were not effectively leveraged as part of a proactive federal effort to conduct timely, comprehensive damage assessments, the military began organizing and deploying its response without fully understanding the extent of the damage or the required assistance." 46 Ultimately, military reconnaissance assets did show up on September 3 and throughout the remainder of the relief efforts to enhance situational awareness and aid recovery efforts. 47 Furthermore, in September 2005, considerable reconnaissance assets were made immediately available to assess damage from Hurricane Rita, largely because of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.
Future disasters will require that the military assumes the PDA role in catastrophic situations and complements PDA Teams during other incidents of national significance. The military needs little training to conduct these assessments because it already performs similar missions during combat. Moreover, it is the only federal organization with the organic assets available to carry out this important mission of preliminary damage assessment. In order to ensure that the military is ready for this role, NORTHCOM, in concert with the Joint Forces
Component Commander -ISR (JFCC-ISR) and Air Combat Command (ACC) must plan and train for catastrophic domestic response scenarios. Emphasis should be focused on the architecture of command response, the types of platforms utilized, surveillance products that can be utilized by responders, and intelligence distribution methods.
Wide-Area Military Surveillance Assets
After Hurricane Katrina, the U-2S Dragon Lady was called to domestic service for the first time to provide critical wide area imagery intelligence to agencies participating in the relief and rescue efforts. The U-2S is a long range, high altitude strategic reconnaissance aircraft that provides the capability for day and night, all-weather surveillance. The Dragon Lady has the capability to provide electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), or imagery intelligence (IMINT) to commanders, but it is its IMINT capabilities that make it an invaluable asset for disaster relief operations. Although national systems, such as commercial or military satellites, could carry out this important mission, the U-2 is best suited for a wide-area, Katrina-type scenario because of its ability to capture a large area while still providing the necessary detail for close analysis. Although extremely useful for wide-area surveillance and often employed for time-sensitive target requirements during combat operations due to COMINT and ELINT system flexibility and responsiveness, the long processing and exploitation times (up to 3 days) for wet film IMINT, lack of streaming video capability, along with high altitude operations preclude optimum use for localized missions such as search and rescue that require continuous imagery contact with individual personnel.
During Katrina relief, the 27 th Intelligence Support Squadron (Beale AFB, CA) processed much of the U-2 imagery and uploaded hundreds of images daily to both secure and non-secure military web sites. 48 In the end, over 2,300 imagery and mapping products were made available for use by authorities to monitor the progress of certain areas as well as examine the extent of destruction of specific structures. 49 Unfortunately, much of this intelligence did not make its way to first responders in a timely manner. The Air Force still needs to look for better ways to improve the dissemination of U-2 imagery, particularly to those at the "lowest levels" of disaster control capabilities so crucial during the first days of disaster response are in the hands of first responders immediately after an incident of national significance.
Conclusion
The sheer size and scale of destruction left by Hurricane Katrina was immense. The subsequent levee failures in Louisiana compounded the problem by flooding New Orleans with up to 20 feet of water within the city levee system with no area to drain. The result was thousands of victims either dead or awaiting much needed rescue and relief. Some have surmised that Hurricane Katrina was the "perfect storm" whose destruction won't be seen again.
However, history has revealed that domestic disasters are unpredictable and can strike anywhere, any place, and at any time with little or no notice. It is in this vein that authorities must plan for the next catastrophic domestic crisis, whether caused by earthquakes on the West Coast of the United States, tornadoes in a heavily populated Mid-Western city, or tsunamis in the Pacific
Northwest. These scenarios -plus the very real threat of chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, or high-explosives (CBRNE) release by terrorists that wish to threaten our country's interests -compel our military to prepare for catastrophic events not only outside, but also within U.S. borders.
The federal military and National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina was both necessary and exceptional. Katrina demonstrated that no other organization maintains the manpower, resources, and capabilities necessary to execute large-scale disaster relief like the military. However, Katrina operations also demonstrated shortcomings within the military that need to be fixed to enhance relief and prevent problems during future responses.
A comprehensive analysis of Hurricane Katrina, the full military response, along with all of the lessons learned is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this report has focused on three primary topics: DoD involvement in disaster response through the NRP, primary military lessons learned from Katrina, and necessary steps to get information to first providers quicker.
Recommendations for the way-ahead include: a rewrite of the NRP and associated Defense Directives to clarify the military role in regional incidents of national significance; thorough planning and exercises between all component responders to ensure preparation, cooperation, and coordination in future responses; NORTHCOM integration and involvement with DHS and the States through planning and training; and better communications and interoperability standards mandated by the rewritten NRP and led by the DoD (through NORTHCOM).
Hurricane Katrina also demonstrated the exceptional value of military ISR assets for use in disaster relief operations. For the first time, Air Force, ANG, and DHS intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets were called to domestic contingency service to provide imagery and full-motion video to military decision-makers and on-scene response providers.
However, work needs to be done to ensure that the significant intelligence provided by military ISR assets can be disseminated to all levels of the component response in a timely fashion. The military must utilize its extensive ISR capabilities to complement the local and state officials during initial preliminary damage assessments. NORTHCOM (as the functional lead), along with ACC, and JFCC-ISR must plan as quickly as possible a dedicated communications architecture capable of providing imagery intelligence gathered from IMINT providers like the U-2 and OC-135B to all component levels during disaster response through an unclassified, centralized Web-based. Additionally, authorities must utilize the off-the-shelf situational awareness that ROVER provides to ensure first responders are equipped with the latest in FMV capability. NORTHCOM, DHS, and State National Guard leadership must work together to procure, organize, and train selected units for use of the ROVER FMV capability.
Although first response is still inherently a local and state responsibility, Hurricane
Katrina has guaranteed that the military must stand ready and will be called to respond during future catastrophic incidents. Proactive actions taken now will ensure the military is better organized, equipped, and trained for immediate action. The end result of these actions will resolve many of the critiques of the military response to Hurricane Katrina, but more importantly, will ensure a quicker response to relieve those in need of relief during future catastrophic incidents of national significance.
